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Abstract: Which commercial bank supervisory policies ease – or intensify – the degree to which bank 
corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance? Based on new data from more than 2,500 firms 
across 37 countries, this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank 
supervisory policies on firms’ financing obstacles. We find that the traditional approach to bank 
supervision, which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to directly monitor, discipline, and 
influence banks, does not improve the integrity of bank lending.  Rather, we find that a supervisory strategy 
that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information 
to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms 
raising external finance. In extensions, we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a 
particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions. 
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Banks provide a substantial proportion of external finance to enterprises around the globe. 
Yet, there have been no previous studies of whether international differences in bank supervision 
influence the obstacles that corporations face in raising external finance. Furthermore, the Basel 
Committee, International Monetary Fund and World Bank promote the development of powerful 
bank supervisory agencies with the authority to monitor and discipline banks. Yet, there exists no 
cross-country evidence to support these recommendations, nor is there evidence on the general 
question of which bank supervisory policies facilitate efficient corporate finance. 
This paper provides the first assessment of the relationship between bank supervisory 
policies and the degree to which corruption in lending impedes the ability of firms to raise external 
finance. Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of bank supervisory policies on 
the extent to which corruption of bank officials impedes the efficient allocation of bank credit. 
Thus, by examining the integrity of bank lending, we distinguish among different approaches to 
supervision as well as more general theories of the role of government in the economy. 
Indeed, general theories of government regulation provide a natural framework for assessing 
bank supervision. When information costs, transactions costs, and government policies interfere 
with the incentives and abilities of private agents to monitor banks, strong official supervision of 
banks can improve the corporate governance of banks (Stigler, 1971).
1 This “supervisory power 
view” holds that private agents frequently lack the incentives and capabilities to monitor powerful 
banks. From this perspective, a powerful supervisory agency that directly monitors and disciplines 
                                                 
1 Also, see Becker (1968) and Becker and Stigler (1974). Furthermore, some may reject the importance of market 
failures in banking. In a world with (i) no information or transactions costs, (ii) governments that maximize social 
welfare, and (iii) well-defined and efficiently enforced property rights, market participants will achieve efficient 
outcomes (Coase, 1960). If the prerequisites for this laissez-faire – invisible hand – theory hold, government supervision 
of banks would be at best irrelevant and potentially harmful to social welfare (Stigler, 1975). The empirical evidence 




banks can enhance the corporate governance of banks, reduce corruption in bank lending, and 
thereby boost the efficiency with which banks intermediate society’s savings. The official 
supervision theory assumes that governments have both the expertise and the incentives to 
ameliorate market imperfections and improve the governance of banks. 
  An alternative to the supervisory power view also draws on core theories of public policy 
and regulation. The “political/regulatory capture view” argues that politicians and supervisors do 
not maximize social welfare; they maximize their own private welfare (Hamilton, et al., 1788; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Becker, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Thus, if bank supervisory 
agencies have the power to discipline non-compliant banks, then politicians and supervisors may 
use this power to induce banks to divert the flow of credit to politically connected firms (Becker and 
Stigler, 1974; Stigler, 1975; Haber et al., 2003). Under these conditions, banks do not only allocate 
capital based on risk-return criteria. Rather, when supervisory agencies have the power to influence 
the distribution of bank loans, then corruption and political ties may shape the allocation of bank 
credit. This theory suggests that strengthening the power of the supervisory agency may actually 
reduce the integrity of bank lending with adverse implications on the efficiency of credit allocation. 
Logical extensions of the political/regulatory capture view imply that powerful supervisory agencies 
will have less of a tendency to abuse their power for private gain in countries with sound institutions 
that constrain exploitative behavior by government officials. We test this hypothesis below. 
  Finally, the “private empowerment view” argues that bank supervisory policies should 
focus on enhancing the ability and incentives of private agents to overcome information and 
transaction costs, so that private investors can exert effective governance over banks. The private 
empowerment view simultaneously recognizes the potential importance of market failures, which 




agencies do not necessarily have incentives to ease market failures. Consequently, the private 
empowerment view seeks to provide supervisors with the responsibility and authority to induce 
banks to disclose accurate information to the public, so that private agents can more effectively 
monitor banks (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). This view also holds that many empowered private bank 
creditors will be less susceptible to capture by politicians and banks than a single supervisory 
agency. Furthermore, the private empowerment view stresses that transparent information will help 
private investors exert effective corporate governance over banks only when sound legal institutions 
operate in the country. Thus, the private empowerment view holds that corruption of bank officials 
will be less of a constraint on corporate finance in countries that foster public information disclosure 
and have well-functioning legal institutions than in countries that rely on powerful official 
supervisors.  
  This paper is further motivated by recent trends in corporate finance and public policy 
debates. First, an enormous theoretical literature examines the role of banks, along with 
shareholders and other financiers, in easing financing constraints and exerting corporate governance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). Based on some of these models, 
empirical research examines how laws concerning shareholders influence corporate finance (Beck 
and Levine, 2005). Yet, there exists no corresponding work that examines how bank supervision 
influences corporate finance. This paper is an initial attempt to better understand how different 
supervisory policies influence the obstacles faced by firms in raising external finance.  
Second, influential international institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, are encouraging countries to strengthen bank 
supervision. Although these recommendations are frequently discussed in the context of avoiding 




banking crises through a 100 percent reserve requirement. Thus, an important, if often under-stated, 
objective of bank supervision is to foster efficient capital allocation; i.e., to finance worthy firms 
based on market – not corrupt -- criteria. To provide information about which types of bank 
supervisory strategies work best to promote efficient corporate finance, this paper assesses the 
impact of different bank supervisory policies on the degree to which bank corruption impedes firms 
from obtaining external finance. 
This paper uses firm-level data on more than 2,500 firms across 37 countries to examine the 
impact of bank supervision on the obstacles that firms encounter in raising external capital. The 
firm-level data come from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), which was conducted 
in 1999. This dataset includes information on firm characteristics, including the degree to which 
bank corruption is important to raising capital. These data are based on survey questions in which 
firms rank the impediments on a scale from one to four, with larger values implying that bank 
corruption is a greater obstacle. 
The bank supervisory data come from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004, henceforth BCL). 
These data include information on official supervisory power, such as the ability to intervene in 
banks, replace managers, force provisioning, stop dividends and other payments, acquire 
information, etc. BCL also collect information on the degree to which supervisory authorities 
facilitate private monitoring of banks by not reducing the incentives of the private sector to monitor 
banks through deposit insurance and by forcing accurate information disclosure. Specifically, BCL 
assemble data on whether bank directors and officials face criminal prosecution for failure to 
disclose information accurately, whether banks must disclose consolidated accounts, whether 
international accounting firms audit banks, whether there is implicit or explicit deposit insurance, 




Econometrically, we use ordered probit and probit procedures because of the discrete nature 
of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the measure of the degree to which corruption 
of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance. The main explanatory variables are 
measures of (1) supervisory power and (2) the degree to which regulations require information 
disclosure by banks and give private creditors incentives to monitor banks. We also control for a 
range of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics. We also use instrumental variables to 
control for potential endogeneity. 
The results are inconsistent with the traditional supervisory power view and provide 
qualified support for the political/regulatory capture view. Specifically, we never find that 
supervisory power lowers corruption in bank lending. Indeed, even in countries with highly 
developed institutions (e.g., effective governments and adherence to the rule of law), we do not find 
that supervisory power improves the integrity of bank lending. Thus, while the BIS, the IMF, and 
the World Bank are advising countries to strengthen direct official oversight of banks, the evidence 
does not support this recommendation. Rather, supervisory power is positively associated with 
corruption in bank lending. We also find that supervisory power is strongly linked to poor legal 
system development, low levels of government effectiveness, and high levels of national corruption. 
Thus, the positive relationship between supervisory power and corruption in bank lending becomes 
insignificant when we control for these other country characteristics.  
The paper also presents evidence that supports the private empowerment view. The data are 
consistent with the view that policies that force accurate information disclosure and provide 
incentives to private investors to monitor banks lower the importance of bank corruption in raising 
external finance. In extensions, we test whether empowering private monitoring only works in 




accurate, transparent information on banks work best to promote integrity in lending in countries 
that adhere to the rule of law. Thus, empowering private monitoring of banks has the largest, 
positive effect in countries with well functioning legal systems. 
This paper is related to recent research. BCL conduct a pure cross-country analysis and find 
that financial development is (1) positively associated with supervisory approaches that force 
information disclosure and (2) negatively associated with powerful supervisors that directly monitor 
and discipline banks. In this paper, we use microeconomic data to examine the channels running 
from bank supervision to corporate finance, rather than examining cross-country connections 
between bank supervision and banking system size.  
A number of methodological concerns need to be noted. First, individual firms subjectively 
report financing obstacles. Thus firms facing the same obstacles in two different countries may 
report different obstacles for reasons that do not depend on actual constraints. Although it is not 
clear that this would bias the results in any particular direction, we provide evidence on the validity 
of the survey information below. Second, the supervisory variables might proxy for other country 
specific factors. Importantly, however, we get the same results when including the official 
supervisory power and private monitoring variables simultaneously. Thus, supervisory power and 
private monitoring are not proxying for the same unspecified factor. Also, the results hold even 
when controlling for many country-specific factors, such as the level of economic development, 
economic growth, macroeconomic stability, overall financial development, differences in political 
systems, state-ownership of banks, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, the laws governing the 
rights of creditors and shareholders, and the overall level of corruption in the economy. Third, 




producing a spurious relationship between supervisory practices and firm financing obstacles. When 
we control for crisis, however, the results do not change.  
Finally, some may view the paper as an atheoretical exploration of the relationship between 
bank supervisory practices and the integrity of bank lending. It is true that we do not estimate a 
single model that explicitly links bank supervisory practices to bank behavior, and then to the 
corporate financing decisions of firms. We do, however, evaluate broad theories of government 
regulation along with influential approaches to bank supervision. Also, given the central importance 
of bank supervisory policies and bank financing around the world, this paper provides initial 
documentation of the relationships between bank supervision policies and corporate financing 
constraints that we hope motivate additional theoretical and empirical work. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
methodology is described in Section 3. Section 4 gives the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data, Summary Statistics, and Links to Theory 
a.  Corruption as an obstacle to firms obtaining external finance: Definitions 
To examine the relationship between bank supervisory strategies and corporate financing 
obstacles, we use data from two main sources: the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
for firm-level data and BCL (2004) for country-level data on bank supervision. 
From the WBES, we use information on over 2,500 firms across 37 non-transition 
economies. While the WBES comprises 80 countries and the BCL database includes data on 107 
countries, the limited overlap reduces our sample. The WBES surveyed firms of all sizes; small 
firms (between 5 and 50 employees) represent 40% of the sample, medium-size (between 51 and 




employees). The survey comprises mostly firms of the manufacturing, construction and services 
sectors. We also have information on whether these are government-owned, foreign-owned, or 
privately-owned firms. The data indicate whether the firm is an exporter and provide information on 
sales, growth, financing patterns, and the number of competitors.  
Bank Corruption equals the response to the question: “Is the corruption of bank officials an 
obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 
(a minor obstacle), 3 (a moderate obstacle), or 4 (a major obstacle)?” Thus, bigger numbers imply 
the corruption of bank officials is a bigger obstacle to obtaining financing. Overall, 7.7% of the 
firms in our sample report bank corruption as a major obstacle, 7.8% rate bank corruption as a 
moderate obstacle, 19.5% respond that corruption is a minor obstacle, while 65% report that the 
corruption of bank officials is not an obstacle to firm growth. Given this distribution of responses, 
we sometimes divided the responses into those with a value of one (65% of the responses) and all 
others. This allows us to use a comparatively balanced distribution of responses, reduce the possible 
influence of outliers, and use instrumental variable procedures that are available for probit analyses 
but not ordered probit regressions. The perceived degree to which the corruption of bank officials is 
an obstacle to efficient corporate finance not only varies across firms within countries, but also 
across countries.
2 For instance, the average firm in Thailand reports that the corruption of bank 
officials is a substantial obstacle to obtaining external finance (3.14), while the average firm in 
Canada or the United Kingdom reports a very high degree of integrity in bank lending (1.03). 
b. Obstacles to firms obtaining external finance: Justification 
We use a unique database to investigate the impact of bank supervision on the integrity of 
bank lending. The WBES survey provides information on the degree to which corruption in lending 
                                                 
2 The overall standard deviation of the bank corruption variable is 0.93, while the between country standard deviation is 




represents an obstacle to firms. Thus, unlike other general measures of firm financing obstacles 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), the WBES 
survey provides direct information from firms about specific perceived obstacles and therefore does 
not infer the existence of general financing constraints from other information. Furthermore, the 
WBES database has excellent coverage of small and medium-size firms (as well as large firms), 
while other cross-country studies of corporate finance focus almost exclusively on large, listed 
corporations. Moreover, the WBES has very broad country coverage that is important for linking 
the firm-level data with the bank supervision data. Finally, we stress that these survey data are 
conducted at the firm-level. While we examine the relationship between firm-level responses and 
national supervisory policies, it is inappropriate to aggregate the firm-level survey responses and 
conduct pure cross-country comparisons because the composition of firms differs markedly across 
countries.  To draw appropriate inferences about the relationship between bank supervisory 
practices and corruption in lending from this database, one needs to control for firm-specific traits. 
As noted in the Introduction, there are good reasons for believing that these self-reported 
data are not biasing the results in favor of this paper’s findings. First, if a firm facing the same 
obstacles will respond to questions differently in different institutional and cultural environments, 
then, to the extent that this represents pure measurement error, it would bias the results against 
finding a significant relationship between bank supervision and firm financing obstacles. Second, 
we obtain the same results when controlling for many country-specific traits. Third, additional work 
suggests that the survey data are closely associated with other measurable outcomes. Hellman et al. 
(2000) show that in a sub-sample of 20 countries there is a close connection between responses and 
measurable outcomes, and they find no systematic bias in the survey responses. Also, reported firm 




Maksimovic, 2005). Furthermore, we examined the connection between reported firm financing 
obstacles and Wurgler’s (2000) measure of the efficiency of investment flows.
3 We find the 
reported financing obstacles are negatively and significantly correlated with this efficiency of 
investment indicator. Finally, we studied the link between survey responses regarding firm 
financing obstacles and industrial expansion. Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), we examine 
whether industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance grow faster in economies where 
firms face lower reported financing obstacles. We find that externally dependent industries grow 
faster in countries where firms report the corruption of bank officials is less of an obstacle to firm 
growth. Thus, firms’ responses to the survey on financing obstacles are capturing more than 
idiosyncratic differences in how firms rank obstacles; the survey data are associated with 
measurable outcomes.  
As an additional robustness check on the usefulness of firm responses to the question 
regarding the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle, we re-do all of the 
analyses controlling for each firm’s response to the following question: “How problematic is 
financing for the operation and growth or your business?” If a particular firm is particularly 
pessimistic or is simply blaming other factors on its performance, this should be reflected in both its 
response to this general financing obstacle question as well as is its response to the more specific 
question on the corruption of bank officials. By incorporating this additional variable in the 
regressions, we lower the likelihood that idiosyncratic firm responses are biasing the results. Thus, 
if we obtain the same results even when controlling for each firm’s response to this general 
financing obstacle question, this strengthens the interpretation of an independent relationship 
                                                 
3 This is an investment elasticity that gauges the extent to which a country increases investment in growing industries 




between the bank supervision indicators and the degree to which the corruption of bank officials is 
an obstacle to firms obtaining external finance.  
c. Firm-specific traits 
In our analysis of bank supervision and corporate finance, we control for several firm 
attributes such as ownership. Government takes on the value one if the government owns any 
percentage of the firm, and Foreign takes on the value one if foreign entities own any fraction of 
the firm.
4  Our sample includes 6% government owned firms and 25% foreign firms.  
We also control for each firm’s business, competitive environment, and size. The 
regressions include dummy variables for whether the firm is an exporting firm (Exporter), whether 
it is a manufacturing firm (Manufacturing) or a service sector firm (Services). The analyses also 
include the log of the number of competitors that each firm faces (Number of Competitors). In 
sum, 39% of the firms in our sample are in manufacturing and 46% in service, and on average they 
face 2.1 competitors. Finally, we include the log of sales in USD as indicator of size (Sales).  
The correlation analysis in Table I Panel B indicates that non-exporting firms, domestically 
owned firms, smaller firms (as measured by sales), and firms with more competitors suffer more 
from bank corruption. 
                                                 
4 While these simple zero-one indicators of ownership may not capture the varying degrees of influence that arise from 
different levels of government or foreign ownership, information on the percentage of ownership is available for less 
than 10 percent of the sample. However, among the firms for which we have data on the percentage of foreign and 
government ownership, more than two thirds of firms with foreign ownership are majority foreign owned and more than 




d.  Bank supervisory policies 
We use two indicators of supervisory practices to test the empirical validity of the 
competing hypotheses outlined in the Introduction.  These indicators and other key country 
characteristics are listed in Appendix Table I. 
Supervisory Power is constructed from 14 dummy variables that indicate whether bank 
supervisors can take specific actions against bank management, bank owners, and bank auditors 
both in normal times and times of distress. This includes information on whether the supervisory 
agency can force a bank to change its internal organizational structure, suspend dividends, stop 
bonuses, halt management fees, force banks to constitute provisions against actual or potential 
losses as determined by the supervisory agency, supersede the legal rights of shareholders, remove 
and replace managers and directors, obtain information from external auditors, and take legal action 
against auditors for negligence.
5 Supervisory agencies can use these powers to improve the 
governance of banks as emphasized by the supervisory power view. The supervisory authority can 
also use these powers to induce banks to funnel credit to favored ends as emphasized by the 
political/regulatory capture view. The exact definition of Supervisory Power is provided in the data 
appendix. We use the first principal component indicator of these variables, which varies between –
3.05 (Singapore) and 1.14 (U.S.) with a mean of –0.11, and higher values indicating wider authority 
for bank supervisors.
6   
The Supervisory Power variable relates to the theoretical debate discussed in the 
Introduction. The supervisory power view predicts that strengthening official oversight of banks 
                                                 
5 Note, we obtain the same results when using a proxy for supervisory power that only includes information on the 
power of the supervisory agency over the bank and excludes the power of the supervisory agency over external auditors. 
We prefer the broader measure because the supervisory power view holds that only a supervisory agency that has both 
the information and the power can improve the corporate governance of banks.  
6 The mean is not exactly equal to zero because we use the raw data from Barth et al. (2004) on the supervisory 




(increasing Supervisory Power) will improve the governance of banks and increase the likelihood 
that bank allocate capital based on sound risk-return tradeoffs, so that Supervisory Power will be 
negatively associated with Bank Corruption.
7  In direct contrast, the political/regulatory capture 
view predicts that Supervisory Power will be positively associated with Bank Corruption. In 
particular, the political/regulatory capture view holds that increases in the power of the official 
supervisory agency to discipline and replace bank directors and managers gives the agency grater 
influence over the allocation of bank credit. If official supervisors have the incentives and ability to 
use this power to promote private interests rather than the public good, then credit allocation will 
potentially reflect political ties, bribes and more subtle emoluments such as family connections and 
future employment opportunities. In this environment, firms will perceive that credit is not simply 
allocated based on risk-return criteria and will therefore be more likely to respond that corruption in 
bank lending hurts the operation and growth of their businesses. Below, we also discuss and test 
more subtle versions of the political/regulatory capture view which stress that in countries with 
sound legal and political institutions, supervisory power will not be abused. From this perspective, 
the impact of supervisory power on the integrity of bank lending depends on institutional 
development. 
Private Monitoring is designed to measure the degree to which bank supervision forces 
banks to disclose accurate information to the public and induces private sector monitoring of banks. 
Private Monitoring is constructed from nine dummy variables that measure whether bank directors 
and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of information disclosed to the public, whether banks 
must publish consolidated accounts, whether banks must be rated and audited, whether banks must 
                                                 
7 See Polinsky and Shavell’s (2000) review of the theory of public enforcement and the discussion in Coase (1988). 
Also, Spiller and Ferejohn (1992) note that lawmakers do not have sufficient information to anticipate all possible 
circumstances. Thus, there may be efficiency gains to delegating power to a supervisory agency that has the expertise 




be audited by certified international auditors, whether subordinated debt is allowable (which may 
create a class of private monitors), and whether there is both no explicit deposit insurance and no 
actual insurance was paid the last time a bank failed (as a measure of the existence of an implicit 
deposit insurance regime). The Private Monitoring Index is constructed as a principal component 
indicator, with higher values indicating more tools and incentives for private bank creditors to 
monitor banks, ranging from –1.56 (Ghana) to 1.46 (United Kingdom).  
In terms of theory, the private empowerment view holds that supervisory policies that force 
accurate information disclosure and give private creditors appropriate incentives can ameliorate 
market failures without increasing the likelihood of political/regulatory capture. According to this 
view, forcing banks to provide transparent comparable information to the public enhances private 
sector oversight of banks and reduces the degree to which bank allocate credit on non-market terms. 
Thus, the private empowerment view holds that Private Monitoring will be negatively associated 
with Bank Corruption. As we develop further below, this private empowerment view presumes that 
the private agents have a sufficiently well-functioning legal system at their disposal so that they can 
exert effective corporate governance over banks when supervisory practices force the disclosure of 
accurate information. Thus, more sophisticated versions of the private monitoring view predict that 
enhancing information transparency will only improve the integrity of bank lending in countries 




e. Country-level control variables 
 To assess the robustness of the relation between bank supervision and firms’ access to 
external financing, we include other country-level variables. We include the growth rate of GDP per 
capita (Growth) since firms in faster growing countries may face lower obstacles. We use the 
inflation rate (Inflation) to proxy for monetary instability, conjecturing that firms in more stable 
environments face fewer obstacles (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001).  
We also include the level of overall banking sector development (Priv), which equals credit 
by banks to the private sector as a share of GDP, since we want to assess the impact of supervision 
on corporate finance independent of overall bank development. Bank development is positively 
associated with economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck, 2000). Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) argue that financial development 
influences growth by easing the external financing constraints faced by firms. Thus, we examine the 
independent impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by firms after controlling 
for overall financial development and conditions in the macroeconomic economy. As shown in 
Table I, Panel C, firms in poorer countries with higher inflation, lower bank development, and less 
information disclosure report higher financing obstacles (Table II Panel C). 
In our sensitivity analyses, we include a variety of country controls. Specifically, we control 
for (i) GDP per capita, which measures the overall level of economic development, (ii) State 
Ownership, which equals the share of a country’s bank assets that are held by banks that are more 
than 50 percent government owned; (iii) Banking Crisis, which equals one if the country has  
experienced a systemic banking crisis during the 1990s and zero otherwise; (iv) Shareholder Rights, 
which is a measure of the legal rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis management and large 




officials, so that larger values signify less corruption, (vi) Rule of Law, which measures legal 
system efficiency, and (vii) Government Effectiveness, which is a measure of bureaucratic quality. 
The Appendix defines these variables and we discuss them further when we present the sensitivity 
analyses. 
 
3. The Empirical Model 
To examine bank supervision and corporate finance, we assume that the enterprise’s 
underlying response can be described by the following equation: 
Bank Corruptionj,k = α  + β 1 Governmentj,k + β 2 Foreignj,k + β 3 Exporterj,k + β 4 No. of Competitorsj,k 
+ β 5 Manufacturingj,k + β 6 Servicesj,k + β 7 Sizej,k + β 8Inflationk + β 9 Growthk + β 10Privk +β 11 Official 
Supervisionk +β 12 Private Monitoring + ε j,k.                            (1) 
 
The j and k subscripts indicate firm and country respectively.  
Unlike the underlying variable, the observed variable Bank Corruption is a polychotomous 
dependent variable with a natural order. Specifically, the enterprise classifies the degree to which 
bank corruption is an obstacle with k = 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the underlying variable is between α k-1 and 
α k+1, with the α -vector being estimated together with the coefficient vector β . We therefore use the 
ordered probit model to estimate equation (1). We use standard maximum likelihood estimation 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  Furthermore, we allow for clustering within 
countries to allow for possible correlation of errors. Specifically, we do not require that the error 
terms are independent across firms within the same country; rather, we require that error terms are 
independent across countries. The results hold when we do not allow for clustering and simply run a 
standard ordered probit under the assumption of independent observations. The coefficients from 
the estimation (with or without clustering), however, cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of a 




structure of the model. Rather, the marginal effect is calculated as φ (β ’x)β , where φ  is the standard 
normal density at β ’x. We also include the Pseudo R
2, a measure of goodness of fit, which is 





A.  Findings 
Table II presents regression results where the dependent variable is Bank Corruption. In 
every regression we control for the array of firm-specific traits discussed above as well as the 
macroeconomic controls: Inflation, Growth, and Priv. To this set of control variables, the first 
regression adds Supervisory Power, and the second adds Private Monitoring. The third regression 
adds Supervisory Power and Private Monitoring simultaneously.  
The final regression in Table II includes all the firm-specific variables, the macroeconomic 
controls, the two supervisory indicators and also includes as an additional control variable, General 
Financing Obstacle, which equals each firm’s response to the question: “How problematic is 
financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Controlling for this general question 
about firm financing obstacles reduces the likelihood that reporting biases or interpretational 
differences across firms drive the results on the relationship between bank supervisory approaches 
and the degree to which bank corruption impedes efficient corporate finance. While including this 
firm-specific response may induce simultaneity bias by adding a regressor that is a priori likely to 
be highly correlated and co-determined with the dependent variable, adding this control variable 




the country level and firms’ responses regarding bank corruption. Thus, we include it as a 
robustness test. 
The results in Table II are inconsistent with the supervisory power view. The supervisory 
power view emphasizes that information costs, transaction costs, and other government policies 
interfere with the ability of private agents to monitor banks. Thus, powerful supervisory agencies 
can improve the governance of banks and thereby minimize the degree to which bank corruption 
represents an obstacle to firms raising external finance. Contrary to the predictions of the 
supervisory power view, however, Supervisory Power never enters negatively in any of the 
regressions. This suggests that powerful supervisors, i.e., supervisors that have the power to oversee 
and discipline banks do not lower the importance of corruption. Indeed, rather than entering 
negatively, Supervisory Power enters positively and significantly in all of the regressions.  
The Table II regression results support the political/regulatory capture view. The 
political/regulatory capture view holds that politicians or banks will capture official supervisors and 
thus increase the importance of corruption in obtaining bank credit and thereby intensify the 
financing obstacles faced by firms. In fact, Supervisory Power enters significantly and positively in 
all of the Table II regressions, which confirms the core predictions of the political/regulatory 
capture view. These results are robust. Even when controlling for the degree to which policies 
emphasize Private Monitoring, Supervisory Power enters positively and significantly. Furthermore, 
when we include information on each firm’s view of the degree to which General Financing 
Obstacles hinder its growth, the results still yield a significant, positive coefficient on Supervisory 
Power.  
The Table II results also support the private empowerment view. The corruption of bank 




supervisory agency forces banks to disclose information to the private sector. This is not an 
argument for laissez-faire. Rather, the Private Monitoring variable is a conglomerate indicator of the 
degree to which supervisory policies force banks to disclose accurate information to the public and 
the degree to which deposit insurance reduces the incentives of private agents to monitor banks. 
Thus, the results suggest that supervisory authorities that actively promote accurate information 
dissemination and do not distort the incentives of depositors to exert corporate governance over 
banks tend to promote the efficient corporate finance. In sum, the Table II results are strongly 
supportive of the private empowerment view: corrupt bank officials are less of a barrier to raising 
capital in countries where supervisory policies force banks to disclose accurate information and give 
private creditors the appropriate incentives. 
The effect of supervisory practices on firms’ financing obstacles is not only statistically 
significant, but also economically relevant, and the econometric model fits the data well.  In terms 
of the fit, the Pseudo R-squares range between five and nine percent, which is high for these types 
of cross-firm empirical studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2005).  In order to assess the economic importance 
of supervisory policies for firms’ perceptions of corruption in lending, we use the column 4 results 
in Table III to quantify the effect that Official Supervision and Private Monitoring have on the 
probability that financing constitutes a major obstacle for firms’ operation and growth.  Specifically, 
we compute the change in the probability that a firm rates the corruption of bank official as a major 
obstacle (i.e., the probability that a firm rates bank corruption as a four) when changing bank 
supervisory policies based on the coefficients in the last regression of Table II (column 4). For 
example, the estimates imply that if a country moves from the 25
th percentile of Supervisory Power 
to the 75
th percentile, the probability that a firm rates bank corruption as a major obstacle increases 




percent of the firms in the sample report that bank corruption is a “major” obstacle. Even more 
substantially, the probability that firm reports bank corruption as a major obstacle decreases from 
11.1% to 4.9% if a country moves from the 25
th percentile of Private Monitoring to the 75
th 
percentile. As another example, consider Chile and Canada. The Table II, column 4 regression 
estimates indicate that if Chile had the Supervisory Power of Canada (-2.15) instead of its own level 
(0.05), there would be a 2.5-percentage point decrease in the probability that Chilean firms rank 
bank corruption as a major obstacle. Also, the coefficient estimates on Private Monitoring indicate 
that if Chile had the Private Monitoring values of Canada (1.05 instead of 0.29), there would be 
almost a three-percentage point drop in the probability that Chilean firms rank bank corruption as a 
major obstacle. Taken together if Chile adopted the supervisory power and private monitoring 
policies of Canada, there would be a 5.3 percentage point drop in the probability that Chilean firms 
report bank corruption as a major constraint on their performance and growth.
8  Together, these 
examples underline the importance that different supervisory approaches have for the incidence of 
corruption in lending.  
B.  Robustness to controlling for other country factors 
Although the Table II results hold when controlling for an array of firm-specific and 
country-specific traits, there may exist concerns that the supervisory variables are proxying for 
other country-specific factors. Countries with different characteristics may choose different 
supervisory practices. At the same time, these different country-specific traits may drive the 
integrity of bank lending. Thus, we need to assess whether some third factor is driving both the 
selection of the supervisory policies and the financing obstacles reported by firms. 
                                                 
8 Note, we include these examples for illustrative purposes only. These conceptual experiments do not explain how to 
convince countries to change supervisory policies, and the reforms to Chilean policies contemplated in the experiments 




The robustness checks in Table III indicate that data are (i) inconsistent with the supervisory 
power view, (ii) consistent with the political/regulatory capture view, and (iii) supportive of the 
private monitoring view. Specifically, when we control for the overall level economic development 
by including real per capital GDP (column 1), Supervisory Power enters positively and significantly 
at the five percent level while Private Monitoring enters negatively and significantly at the ten 
percent level, which reflects the very strong, positive correlation between Private Monitoring and 
GDP per capita (a correlation coefficient of 0.69). Moreover, even when controlling for (1) the 
percentage of the banking industry owned by the government (State Ownership), (2) a dummy 
variable of whether the country recently experienced a systemic banking crisis (Banking Crisis),  
(3) the degree to which laws protect shareholder rights (Shareholder Rights), the data continue to 
indicate (i) a strong positive relationship between Supervisory Power and Bank Corruption and (ii) 
a strong, negative relationship between Private Monitoring and the degree to which corruption of 
bank officials hinders firm performance (Table III, columns 2-4).
9   
Furthermore, we were concerned that an individual firm’s response to a question about the 
degree to which bank corruption hinders that firm’s access to credit would simply reflect beliefs 
about the overall level of corruption in the country and not specific information about the integrity 
of bank-firm relationships. Thus, in column 5 of Table III, we control for the overall level of 
corruption in the economy by using the ICRG indicator of corruption, where higher values indicate 
less corruption. While (a) Corruption enters significantly and (b) the very strong correlation 
between Corruption and Supervisory Power (correlation coefficient of 0.60) drives out the 
significance of Supervisory Power, we continue to find that (1) Supervisory Power does not enter 
                                                 
9 We also controlled for (1) a measure of the level of legal protection of creditors from La Porta et al (1998) and (2) a 
measure of regulatory impediments on banking operations from the Heritage Foundation. Controlling for these country 




with a negative coefficient, which contradicts the supervisory power view and (2) Private 
Monitoring exerts a negative impact on corruption in lending. 
To control for the general institutional environment, we include indicators of both legal 
system and government effectiveness. In particular, Rule of Law measures the quality of contract 
enforcement and the court system. Government Effectiveness is based on survey information on the 
competence and efficiency of the bureaucracy and public sector. Again, the data are inconsistent 
with the supervisory power view: Supervisory Power does not enter negatively in either regression 
6 or 7. As reported in Table I, however, there is a strong negative correlation between Supervisory 
Power and both the Rule of Law (-0.45) and Government Effectiveness (-0.47). This drives out the 
independent significance of Supervisory Power when these institutional variables are included in 
regressions 6 and 7. Nonetheless, while Supervisory Power tends to be higher in countries with low 
levels of the Rule of Law and low levels of Government Effectiveness, Supervisory Power does not 
have a positive influence on the integrity of bank lending. Thus, Supervisory Power is not 
beneficial; rather, it is associated with higher corruption in lending and lower levels of institutional 
development. Furthermore, the results support the private monitoring view. Even though Private 
Monitoring is highly, positively correlated with the Rule of Law (0.58) and Government 
Effectiveness (0.59) (Table I.C), Private Monitoring enters the bank corruption regression 
negatively and significantly when controlling for the Rule of Law at the 10 percent level (regression 
6) and negatively and significantly at the five percent level when controlling for Government 
Effectiveness (regression 7). Thus, even when controlling for firm specific traits, economic growth, 




development, the regression results indicate that Private Monitoring lowers the degree to which firm 
report that corruption in lending hinders firm operations and growth.
10     
C. Nonlinear Effect: Interaction Terms 
Some versions of the political/regulatory capture and private monitoring views suggest a 
nonlinear relationship between corruption in lending and supervisory practices. Specifically, the 
private monitoring view holds that when supervisory agencies force banks to disclose accurate 
information to the public, then private investors can use this information to exert effective 
governance over banks with positive implications for the integrity of bank lending. This view, 
however, presumes that private investors have a well-functioning legal system at their disposal so 
that they can use this information to improve bank operations. Furthermore, this view presumes that 
the government is effective at forcing banks to disclose accurate information. That is, the 
government not only has statutes requiring banks to disclose accurate information, it successfully 
induces banks to disclose this information to the public. From this perspective, improvements in 
information disclosure rules will only improve the quality of bank lending when the legal system 
and government work effectively. We test this. Furthermore, the political/regulatory capture view 
holds that powerful supervisors may use their positions to alter the flow of bank credit for private or 
political reasons. International differences in legal and government institutions, however, may alter 
the degree to which supervisory agencies abuse their powers. That is, effective institutions may 
reduce the ability of supervisory agencies to promote private, rather than public, interests. From this 
perspective, increases in supervisory power may only hurt the quality of bank lending when 
                                                 
10 We also conducted robustness tests controlling for the overall political environment. Specifically, we included an 
indicator of the degree to which citizens can select, monitor, and remove the executive and legislative officials (Voice 
and Accountability). We also controlled for (i) the degree of checks and balances in the political system by including 
the number of veto players in the political decision process and (ii) competitiveness of legislative elections. This paper’s 




institutions do not work very effectively. We examine whether the impact of both Supervisory 
Power and Private Monitoring on corruption in lending depends on national institutions. 
In Table III (regressions 8 and 9), we include interaction terms to test for possible nonlinear 
relationships between supervisory policies, institutional development, and corruption in lending. 
More specifically, in regression 8, we include two interaction terms: the interaction between the 
Rule of Law and Supervisory Power and Private Monitoring. In regression 9, we include two 
different interaction terms: the interaction between Government Effectiveness and Supervisory 
Power and Private Monitoring. Since these indicators are principal components indicators, we add 
five to Supervisory Power, Private Monitoring, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness in 
regression 8 and 9 so that none of the observations is zero or negative, which makes it possible to 
interpret the coefficient on the interaction term and assess the possible nonlinear impact of the 
supervisory indicators on corruption in lending. These regressions include each of the supervisory 
indicators, the institutional indicator, and two interaction terms. Since these are all highly correlated 
country-specific traits and there are only 37 countries in our panel of firms, it may be difficult to 
identify the individual effects. Nevertheless, it is valuable to assess whether supervisory practices 
operate differently in different settings. 
We find that (1) Private Monitoring increases the integrity of bank lending in countries with 
sufficiently well developed legal and government institutions, but has no significant effect in 
countries with poor institutions and (2) Supervisory Power never has a significant, positive effect on 
the integrity of bank lending, even in countries with highly developed legal and government 
systems.  More specifically, consider regression (8) in Table III, which includes the Supervisory 
Power, Private Monitoring, the Rule of Law and both the interaction between the Rule of Law and 




enters with a significant, positive coefficient while the interaction between Rule of Law and Private 
Monitoring enters with a significant negative coefficient. While the significant positive coefficient 
on Private Monitoring suggests that Private Monitoring increases corruption in lending, this is more 
than balanced by the negative coefficient on the interaction term between Private Monitoring and 
the Rule of Law. The derivative of regression 8 with respect to Private Monitoring equals 1.38 -
0.34*(Rule of Law). This is only positive for the three countries with the lowest values of the Rule 
of Law (Kenya, Guatemala, and Nigeria) and for these countries we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the effect of a marginal increase in Private Monitoring has no effect on corruption in 
lending. For the next 12 countries with low levels of the Rule of Law, the marginal effect of Private 
Monitoring is negative (i.e., it lowers corruption) but again we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the effect is statistically insignificant. For the 22 countries with the highest levels of the Rule of 
Law, we find that a marginal increase in Private Monitoring exerts a significant, negative impact on 
corruption in lending. In regression 9, which focuses on Government Effectiveness, we find the 
same result and similar cut-offs. Critically, a marginal increase in Private Monitoring never 
significantly increases corruption in lending. Rather, Private Monitoring significantly reduces 
corruption in lending in the 22 (out of the 37) countries in our sample with the highest levels of 
Government Effectiveness and the Rule of Law.  
In terms of Supervisory Power, the results confirm that Supervisory Power does not increase 
the integrity of bank lending, even when accounting for cross-country differences in institutional 
development. First, note that Supervisory Power and the interaction terms between Supervisory 
Power and the Rule of Law never enter significantly. Second, while the individual coefficients are 
insignificant, it is still possible to compute whether the joint effect of a marginal increase in 




Law and Government Effectiveness. When we do this, we never find that an increase in Supervisory 
Power exerts a significant negative impact on bank corruption. Thus, the results are clearly 
inconsistent with the supervisory power view: The marginal impact of official supervisory power on 
corruption in lending is either positive or insignificant.
11 
The results using interaction terms stress three hypotheses. First, there is no evidence that 
empowering official supervisors improves the integrity of bank lending. Second, for the bulk of the 
sample, promoting the dissemination of transparent information about banks reduces corruption in 
lending. Third, the positive impact of Private Monitoring on the integrity of lending depends on 
legal institutions and government effectiveness: Private Monitoring exerts a more positive impact 
on lending integrity in better functioning institutional settings. 
 
D. Endogeneity, the distribution of responses, and outliers 
We were concerned that since we do not have a balanced distribution of responses across the 
four categories of answers regarding corruption of bank lending, that this might invalidate the 
ordered probit estimator or that a few outliers in one of the categories with a small number of 
responses could exert an undue influence on the results. As mentioned, 65 percent of firms 
responded that corruption in bank lending is not a significant barrier to firm growth, while 35 
percent indicated that bank corruption is an obstacle with some indicating it is a minor, moderate, or 
major obstacle. Thus, we did two robustness checks. First, we omitted each country one-at-a-time to 
see if firm responses from any single country drive the results. The results hold. Second, we 
                                                 
11 In terms of the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness, note that the direct effect of these two institutional 
indicators is positive in regressions 8 and 9, but one must also account for the indirect effects associated with the 
interaction terms. When doing this, two results are important from the parameters estimates in equations 8 and 9: (1) for 
no country in the sample does an increase in the Rule of Law or Government Effectiveness imply a significant increase 
in corruption in lending and (2) for 11 countries in the sample, an increase in the Rule of Law or Government 
Effectiveness implies an significant reduction in corruption in lending after controlling for all of the other control 




employed a probit estimator, where we simply designate the bank corruption variable as equal to 
zero when firms respond that corruption is no obstacle and give the bank corruption variable a one 
for all other responses. This produces a comparatively balanced sample of responses for the probit 
estimation.  
As shown in regressions 1-4 of Table IV, this paper’s results hold when using the probit 
estimator. Again, note that in regression 4, we control for individual firm responses to the question, 
“How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?”  By controlling for 
each firm’s views on the degree to which general financial obstacles hinder firm growth, we 
identify the specific link between supervisory practices and corruption in bank lending and abstract 
from the possibility that particular firms are simply pessimistic about their financing and growth 
opportunities. In regression 1-4, Supervisory Power never enters negatively; rather, Supervisory 
Power enters with a positive and significant coefficient. These findings are inconsistent with the 
supervisory power view and broadly supportive of the predictions from the political/regulatory 
capture hypothesis. Moreover, Private Monitoring always enters negatively and significantly, which 
indicates that supervisory policies that force the accurate disclosure of information by banks to the 
public enhance lending integrity. We also find that the probit model performs relatively well, 
correctly predicting at least 65% of all observations.  
Next, we were concerned about possible endogeneity. This is less of a concern than in pure 
cross-country analyses because we are examining the impact of policies on individual firms. It 
seems unlikely that an individual firm’s views about corruption in lending will influence national 
bank regulatory policies. Nonetheless, there may be feedback from the corporate sector to policy: 
High levels of corruption in lending may induce calls for more official supervision. Or, some third 





12  We base the selection of instrumental variables on the theory and empirical work 
in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004, 2005), who study the determinants of international differences 
in bank supervisory and regulatory policies. In particular, we include the absolute value of a 
country’s latitude, ethnic fractionalization, and the length of time it has been independent. We 
include latitude because a growing body of work suggests that the geographical endowments 
encountered by Europeans as they colonized much of the world shaped the construction of 
institutions and policies that endured after countries gained their independence.
13  In particular, 
Europeans frequently did not settle in large numbers in tropical climates, so they tended to form 
extractive regimes where small elites developed institutions and policies that facilitated their ability 
to extract natural resources or grow cash crops. These extractive regimes tended to create powerful 
administrative structures that protected the elite. In contrast, more temperate climates with greater 
numbers of European settlers tended to create more egalitarian policies. We include ethnic 
fractionalization because research indicates that more ethnically diverse economies tend to choose 
policies that allow those in power to expropriate resources from others (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
Thus, ethnically diverse countries tend to choose policies associated with slower economic growth. 
Finally, we include the percentage of years that the country has been independent since 1776 
because countries that gained their independence in the 18
th or 19
th centuries had more opportunity 
to modify colonial institutions and policies and adopt policies more conducive to broad-based 
economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
These instruments predict cross-country variation in bank supervisory policies.  In 
particular, we reject the null hypothesis at the five percent level that instruments do not explain 
                                                 
12 Note, instrumental variable estimators have not been developed, to our knowledge, for the ordered probit 
specifications used in earlier tables. 
13 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 




cross-country differences in Private Monitoring and Supervisory Power.  Further, latitude, ethnic 
fractionalization and years of independence together explain 28% of cross-country variation in 
Official Supervision and 45% of cross-country variation in Private Monitoring. Thus, the first-stage 
regressions help account for differences in supervisory practices.  We do not claim that these 
instruments are the only, or necessarily the best, exogenous explanations of bank supervisory 
practices. Rather, we hold that the instruments are reasonably exogenous, past theoretical and 
empirical work suggests that these instruments will explain policies today, and the first-stage results 
confirm that these are worthwhile instruments. 
The instrumental variable regression results suggest that (1) Supervisory Power exerts a 
positive – not a negative – effect on corruption in lending and (2) Private Monitoring lowers the 
degree to which firms respond that corruption in bank lending hinders firm operations. As shown in 
regressions 5 – 8 of Table IV, Supervisory Power enters positively and significantly at the one 
percent level in all of these regressions which control for potential simultaneity bias. Furthermore, 
Private Monitoring enters negatively and significantly at the one percent level in all of the 
specifications. Thus, even when using instrumental variables and while controlling for firm specific 
traits and country characteristics, such as inflation, economic growth, financial development, the 
level of economic development, the extent of national corruption, the results are consistent with the 
private monitoring view, inconsistent with the supervisory power view, and generally supportive of 
the political/regulatory capture view of bank supervision. 
To provide additional evidence on the causal relationship between banking sector policies 
and corruption in lending, it would be desirable to assess the effects of innovations in bank 
supervision policies on corruption in lending and vice versa. At this point, however, the absence of 




the potential limitations with a pure cross-section examination, we interpret the finding that the 
component of Official Supervision and Private Monitoring explained by exogenous country 
characteristics is associated with corruption in lending as suggestive evidence that this relationship 
is not due only to reverse causation and simultaneity bias. 
 
  E. Different samples and estimation procedures 
This sub-section presents robustness checks using different sub-samples and estimators.  
First, we test whether the results are robust to only including the sub-sample of firms that 
actually receive bank financing. The full sample might contain firms that have not applied for bank 
credit, either because they feel discouraged or because they do not need it. The results hold with this 
sub-sample (Table V, column 1). 
Second, we also tested whether the results are robust to only including the sub-sample of 
firms that do not receive bank financing to see if they have a different perception of the importance 
of the corruption of bank officials in raising capital. Again, we obtain very similar results with this 
sub-sample. (Table V, column 2). 
Third, the number of firms varies substantially across countries. Though we use an ordered 
probit estimator with robust standard errors and allow for clustering within countries, we assess the 
robustness of the results using a weighted ordered probit. The weights are the inverse of the number 
of firms in each country.
14 The results are robust to this estimation procedure (Table V, column 3).  
 
                                                 
14 Note, it is not appropriate to run a pure cross-country regression while averaging across the financing obstacle 
variables for each country because (i) the composition of firms varies substantially across countries and (ii) the 
polychotomous nature of the financing obstacles data suggest the use of an ordered probit, while controlling for 





  This paper (1) documents the relationship between bank supervision and the degree to which 
bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance and (2) provides evidence on 
different theories of bank supervision. The results support three conclusions about which bank 
supervisory practices work best to ease the external financing obstacles faced by firms. 
  First, the data are strongly inconsistent with the view that powerful supervisory agencies 
with the authority to directly monitor and discipline banks facilitate efficient corporate finance. The 
results indicate that countries with stronger supervisory agencies – countries where supervisory 
agencies can intervene banks, replace managers, force provisioning, stop dividends, etc. – tend to 
have firms that face greater obstacles to obtaining bank loans because of corrupt bank officials than 
firms in countries where the supervisory agency is less powerful. The results are inconsistent with 
theories that hold that powerful official supervisory agencies promote social welfare by overcoming 
information and enforcement costs and efficiently monitoring banks. 
Second, the results provide some support for the political/regulatory capture view, which 
emphasizes that powerful supervisory agencies are prone to capture and manipulation by politicians, 
regulators, or both. Specifically, we find that powerful supervisory agencies tend to lower the 
integrity of bank lending. This conclusion needs to be tempered, however. Powerful supervision is 
so strongly correlated with poor national institutions (government ineffectiveness, the absence of 
the rule of law, high national corruption) that it is difficult to identify an independent relationship 
between supervisory power and bank corruption when controlling for these institutional traits. 
  Third, the analyses are consistent with the private monitoring view. In particular, bank 
supervisory strategies that focus on forcing accurate information disclosure and not distorting the 




are consistent with approaches that simultaneously recognize that private agents face substantive 
information and enforcement costs when monitoring banks, while also recognizing that politicians 
and regulators will act in their own interests and not necessarily act to reduce market frictions. In 
extensions, we find that private monitoring exerts a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of 
bank lending in countries with sound legal and bureaucratic institutions. These results on private 
monitoring support the Basel Committee’s recent emphasis on the importance of private sector 
monitoring of banks (Basel II’s third pillar). 
  At a very general level, these results emphasize the importance of both market and political 
failures. Bank supervision clearly matters. Bank supervisory policies that ameliorate market failures 
by forcing the accurate disclosure of information reduce the obstacles that firms face in raising 
external finance. This is not a laissez faire finding. This result suggests that active bank supervision 
can help ease information costs and improve the integrity of bank lending. Just as clearly, however, 
the results highlight the importance of theories that emphasize political and regulatory capture and 
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Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panels B and C, respectively. Bank Corruption is the response to the question “How 
problematic is corruption of bank officials for the operation and growth of your business?”  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question 
“How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 
(moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Manufacturing and Services are industry 
dummies. Sales equals the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is 
the growth rate of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as 
share of GDP.  Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private 
Monitoring is a principal components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the 
public and whether regulations facilitate and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. GDP per Capita is in PPP adjusted dollars and averaged 
over 1995-99. Corruption is a survey indicator of the absence of corruption in a country. Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness are principal 
component indicators of survey indicators of the legal system effectiveness and bureaucratic efficiency in a country, respectively. Shareholder Rights 
measures the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis block holders and management. State Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by the 
government. Banking Crisis indicates whether a country suffered a banking crisis during the 1990s.  Detailed definitions and the sources are in the 
data appendix. *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics: 
 
Mean Median St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations
Bank Corruption  1.58 1.00 0.93 4.00 1.00 2,510
General Financing Obstacle  2.58 3.00 1.13 4.00 1.00 2,510
Government 0.06 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.00 2,510
Foreign 0.25 0.00 0.44 1.00 0.00 2,510
Exporter 0.43 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2,510
Sales 15.16 16.01 5.12 25.33 -2.12 2,510
Number of Competitors  0.72 0.69 0.30 2.20 0.00 2,510
Manufacturing 0.39 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.00 2,510
Services 0.46 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2,510
Inflation 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.58 0.00 37
Growth 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 37
Priv 0.45 0.38 0.32 1.16 0.04 37
Supervisory Power  -0.11 0.05 1.09 1.14 -3.05 37
Private Monitoring  0.20 0.29 0.77 1.46 -1.56 37
GDP per Capita  9,226 6,035 8,246 30,056 554 37
Corruption 3.30 3.00 1.18 1.32 6.00 37
Rule of Law  0.24 0.13 0.89 -1.22 1.94 37
Government Effectiveness  0.30 0.04 0.88 -1.32 2.08 37
Shareholder Rights  3.15 3 1.38 5 1 26
State Ownership  0.19 0.12 0.21 0.8 0 34














Obstacle  Government Foreign  Exporter  Sales 
Number of 
Competitors  Manufacturing 
General  Financing  Obstacle  0.28***           
Government -0.02  -0.04*  1          
Foreign  -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.02  1         
Exporter -0.07***  -0.01  0.04**  0.22***  1       
Sales  -0.16**  -0.16*** -0.08*** 0.13***  0.01  1     
Number of Competitors  0.10*** 0.07*** -0.00  -0.03  0.04**  -0.27***  1   
Manufacturing  -0.00  0.02 0.02 0.07***  0.31***  -0.10**  0.01  1 

























Inflation  0.28*  1                 
Growth    -0.31*  -0.36**  1               
Supervisory Power  0.36**  0.22  -0.25  1               
Private Monitoring  -0.36**  -0.33**  0.16  -0.23  1             
GDP per Capita  -0.46**  -0.44***  0.31*  -0.43***  0.69***  1           
Priv -0.10  -0.54***  0.07  -0.23  0.48***  0.66***  1         
Corruption -0.60***  -0.42**  0.39***  -0.44*** 0.46***  0.66***  0.47***  1       
Shareholder Rights  -0.47**  -0.42**  0.40**  -0.21  0.28  0.16  0.21  0.36*  1      
State Ownership  0.35**  0.23  0.11  0.13  -0.29*  -0.34**  -0.23  -0.41**  -0.27  1    
Banking Crisis  0.32*  0.30  -0.33*  0.06  -0.05  -0.16  -0.14  -0.32*  -0.43**  0.21  1  
Rule of Law  -0.41**  -0.44***  0.51***  -0.45*** 0.58***  0.82***  0.65***  0.70***  0.35*  -0.17  -0.20  1 
Government 







Supervision and Bank Corruption 
 
The underlying model is: Bank Corruption = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4Manufacturing + β 5 Services + β 6 Sales +β 7 Number 
of Competitors +β 8 Inflation + β 9 Growth + β 10 Priv + +β 11 Supervision + ε. Bank Corruption is the response to the question “Is the corruption of 
bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?”  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How 
problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Manufacturing and Services are industry 
dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is 
the growth rate of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as 
share of GDP. Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private 
Monitoring is a principal components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the 
public and whether regulations facilitate and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. The regressions are run with ordered probit. Detailed 
variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 
1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 1  2  3  4 
Government -0.148  -0.159  -0.150  -0.093 
 (0.339)  (0.301)  (0.329)  (0.510) 
Foreign -0.178  -0.187  -0.178  -0.087 
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.144) 
Exporter -0.088  -0.159  -0.123  -0.126 
 (0.180)  (0.027)**  (0.075)*  (0.100)* 
Manufacturing 0.093  0.090  0.042  0.080 
 (0.256)  (0.265)  (0.602)  (0.288) 
Services 0.088  0.146  0.098  0.166 
 (0.321)  (0.104)  (0.269)  (0.035)** 
Sales -0.023  -0.020  -0.021  -0.014 
 (0.107)  (0.114)  (0.076)*  (0.249) 
Number of Competitors  0.183  0.099  0.097  0.116 
 (0.284)  (0.513)  (0.503)  (0.381) 
Inflation 1.023  1.477  1.520  1.670 
 (0.128)  (0.046)**  (0.051)*  (0.021)** 
Growth 0.035  0.183  0.222  0.276 
 (0.784)  (0.233)  (0.171)  (0.068)* 
Priv -6.170  -7.628  -4.999  -2.896 
 (0.375)  (0.208)  (0.401)  (0.613) 
Supervisory Power  0.165    0.150  0.155 
 (0.021)**    (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Private Monitoring     -0.386  -0.368  -0.347 
   (0.002)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)*** 
General Financing Obstacle        0.298 
       (0.000)*** 
        
Observations 2510  2510  2510  2510 






 Table III 
Supervision and Bank Corruption – Controlling for Other Country Characteristics 
The underlying model is Bank Corruption = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Manufacturing + β 5 Services + β 6 Sales +β 7 Number of 
Competitors +β 8 Inflation + β 9 Growth + β 10 Priv + β 11X +β 12 Supervision + ε. Bank Corruption is the response to the question “Is the corruption of 
bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership 
and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales 
is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is the growth rate of 
GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP. 
Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private Monitoring is a 
principal components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the public and whether 
regulations facilitate and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. X is one of seven variables; GDP per Capita is in PPP adjusted dollars and 
averaged over 1995-99. Shareholder Rights measures the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis block holders and management. State Ownership 
indicates the share of banks owned by the government. Banking Crisis indicates whether a country suffered a banking crisis during the 1990s. 
Corruption is a survey indicator of the absence of corruption in a country. Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness are principal component 
indicators of survey indicators in the respective category, measuring legal system effectiveness and bureaucratic efficiency, respectively. In columns 8 
ands 9 we interact (5+Private Monitoring) and (5+Supervisory Power) with (5+Rule of Law) and (5+Government Effectiveness), respectively. The 
regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Inflation  1.703 1.440 1.459 0.572 1.335 1.763 1.676 1.753 1.376 
 (0.029)**  (0.093)*  (0.102)  (0.526)  (0.035)**  (0.010)*** (0.031)** (0.013)** (0.055)* 
Growth  -3.160  -7.114  -7.579  -2.754 1.341 1.688 0.752 -0.377  -7.413 
  (0.631) (0.213) (0.264) (0.586) (0.810) (0.808) (0.923) (0.962) (0.326) 
Priv  0.270 0.264 0.291 0.174 0.295 0.334 0.337 0.339 0.247 
  (0.139)  (0.124)  (0.126)  (0.408)  (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.091)*  (0.037)** (0.157) 
Supervisory  Power  0.132 0.143 0.187 0.170 0.093 0.107 0.105 -0.095  -0.374 
 (0.019)**  (0.039)**  (0.001)*** (0.004)***  (0.132) (0.114) (0.106) (0.839) (0.404) 
Private Monitoring   -0.297  -0.422  -0.366  -0.370  -0.292  -0.275  -0.299  1.382  2.284 
 (0.057)*  (0.003)*** (0.015)** (0.017)**  (0.005)*** (0.056)* (0.022)**  (0.033)**  (0.010)*** 
GDP  per  Capita  -0.113          
  (0.403)          
State  Ownership   0.407         
   (0.260)         
Banking  Crisis    0.078        
    (0.671)        
Shareholder  Rights     -0.164       
     (0.003)***       
Corruption      -0.277      
         (0.001)***     
Rule of Law            -0.257    1.428   
           (0.089)*    (0.046)**   
Government  Effectiveness        -0.251   2.426 
        (0.166)   (0.017)** 
Rule of Law* Supervisory Power        0.040   
         (0.600)   
Rule of Law* Private Monitoring        -0.339   
         (0.007)***  
Government  Effectiveness*          0.096 
Supervisory  Power          (0.187) 
Government  Effectiveness*          -0.528 
Private  Monitoring          (0.002)*** 
Observations  2510 2340 2010 1985 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 






Supervision and Bank Corruption – Controlling for Sampling and Endogeneity Biases 
 
The underlying model is: Bank Corruption Dummy = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Manufacturing + β 5 Services + β 6 Sales +β 7 
Number of Competitors +β 8 Inflation + β 9 Growth + β 10 Priv + β 11X +β 12 Supervision + ε. Bank Corruption Dummy is the response to the question “Is 
the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?”, where “no obstacle” is equal to zero and “minor”, 
“moderate” and “major” is equal to one. Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Manufacturing and Services are industry 
dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is the 
growth rate of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of 
GDP. Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private Monitoring 
is a principal components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the public and 
whether regulations facilitate and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. GDP per Capita is in PPP adjusted dollars and averaged over 1995-
99. Corruption is a survey indicator of absence of corruption in a country. General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How 
problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?”   Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
Regressions in columns (1) – (4) are run with probit with clustered errors, while regressions in columns (5) - (8) are run with IV probit, where the first 
stage regressions use ethnic fractionalization, percentage of years in independence since 1776 and a country’s absolute value of latitude as 
instrumental variables.  P-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. % correctly 
defined is the percentage of observations, for which the predicted value is greater (lower) than 65% if Bank corruption dummy is equal to one (zero). 
 
   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
          
Inflation  1.612 1.726 1.456 1.783 1.919 1.436 1.536 2.083 
  (0.036)** (0.027)** (0.017)** (0.012)** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Growth  -2.588 -1.434 3.764  -0.213 0.532  -9.034 4.769  1.846 
  (0.689) (0.838) (0.539) (0.974) (0.829) (0.005)***  (0.052)*  (0.460) 
Priv  0.221 0.251 0.300 0.273 0.385 0.270 0.347 0.415 
  (0.170)  (0.167)  (0.034)**  (0.066)*  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Supervisory  Power  0.169 0.157 0.111 0.171 0.322 0.306 0.255 0.257 
  (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.096)*  (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Private  Monitoring    -0.390 -0.345 -0.313 -0.374 -0.596 -1.277 -0.336 -0.590 
  (0.002)*** (0.027)**  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GDP  per  Capita    -0.071     0.552    
    (0.608)     (0.001)***    
Corruption     -0.278     -0.235   
     (0.002)***     (0.000)***   
General  Financing  Obstacle      0.289     0.280 
      (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
           
Observations  2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 
Pseudo  R  square  0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13         






Supervision and Bank Corruption – Robustness Tests 
 
The underlying model is: Bank Corruption = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Manufacturing + β 5 Services + β 6 Sales +β 7 Number of 
Competitors +β 8 Inflation + β 9 Growth + β 10 Priv + +β 11 Supervision + ε. Bank Corruption is the response to the question “Is the corruption of bank 
officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership 
and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales 
is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is the growth rate of 
GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP. 
Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private Monitoring is a 
principal components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the public and whether 
regulations facilitate and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. The regression in column 1 is for a sample of firms that received bank finance, 
while the regression in column 2 is for a sample that excludes firms that received bank finance. The regression in column 3 is weighted with the 
inverse of the number of firms in the country. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
   
 1  2  3 
 
Firms with Access 
to Bank Finance 
Firms without 




      
Inflation 1.990  1.155  1.144 
 (0.012)**  (0.198)  (0.193) 
Growth -2.901  -5.958  -1.167 
 (0.704)  (0.380)  (0.863) 
Priv 0.177  0.240  0.166 
 (0.312)  (0.170)  (0.258) 
Supervisory Power  0.141  0.159  0.176 
 (0.031)**  (0.009)***  (0.005)*** 
Private Monitoring   -0.321  -0.401  -0.302 
 (0.022)**  (0.006)***  (0.011)** 
      
Observations 1074  1436  2510 










Appendix Table I 
Supervisory Practices and Country Characteristics 
Supervisory Power is a principal components indicator of the power of supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks. Private Monitoring is a principal 
components indicator of the degree to which regulations force banks to disclose accurate, transparent information to the public and whether regulations facilitate 
and encourage private sector monitoring of banks. GDP per Capita is in PPP adjusted dollars and averaged over 1995-99. Rule of Law and Government 
Effectiveness are principal component indicators of survey indicators of the legal system effectiveness and bureaucratic efficiency in a country, respectively. 








Capita Rule of Law
Government 
Effectiveness
Argentina -0.30 1.13 11,544 0.32 0.26
Bolivia  0.22 0.06 2,197 -0.35 -0.22
Botswana  0.82 0.97 6,035 0.5 0.22
Brazil  1.00 0.97 6,735 -0.22 -0.22
Canada -2.15 1.05 23,907 1.55 1.72
Chile  0.05 0.29 8,188 1.09 1.17
Egypt  0.38 -0.13 3,035 0.13 -0.14
El Salvador  0.09 0.29 4,205 -0.66 -0.26
France -1.16 0.69 22,167 1.08 1.28
Germany -0.91 0.97 23,193 1.48 1.41
Ghana -0.09 -1.56 1,732 -0.01 -0.29
Guatemala -0.28 -1.14 3,580 -1.11 -0.23
Honduras  0.82 -0.42 2,421 -0.9 -0.41
India -0.36 -0.42 2,044 0.16 -0.26
Indonesia  0.74 0.25 2,912 -0.92 -0.53
Italy -1.66 1.27 22,274 0.86 0.77
Kenya  1.00 -1.00 995 -1.22 -0.9
Malawi -0.10 -1.25 554 -0.41 -0.62
Malaysia -0.25 0.55 7,743 0.83 0.71
Mexico -0.17 -0.43 7,589 -0.47 0.18
Namibia -0.54 -0.13 5,726 0.95 0.04
Nigeria  0.61 0.39 805 -1.1 -1.32
Panama  1.14 -0.13 5382 -0.39 -0.28
Peru  0.09 0.29 4,425 -0.52 0.17
Philippines  0.95 -0.63 3,612 -0.08 0.13
Portugal  1.00 0.97 14,559 1.08 1.15
Singapore -3.05 0.35 19,456 1.94 2.08
South Africa  -2.95 0.77 8,902 -0.35 -0.01
Spain -0.32 0.97 1,7052 1.03 1.6
Sweden -1.55 0.69 21,220 1.62 1.57
Thailand  0.72 -0.42 6,096 0.41 0.01
Trinidad & Tobago  -0.91 -0.43 7,306 0.51 0.52
Turkey -0.30 0.69 5,614 -0.01 -0.41
United Kingdom  0.59 1.46 21,654 1.69 1.97
United States  1.14 0.97 30,056 1.25 1.37
Venezuela  1.14 -0.43 5,690 -0.66 -0.85






  Appendix : Variables and Sources   
     
Variable Definition  Original source  
Bank Corruption  Is the corruption of bank officials no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle 
(2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Banking Crisis  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country suffered a 
systemic banking crisis during the 1990s 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) 
Banking Freedom  Indicator of openness of banking and financial system: specifically, 
whether the foreign banks and financial services firms are able to 
operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other 
financial services firms, how heavily regulated the financial system 
is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide 
customers with insurance and invest in securities (and vice-versa). 
The index ranges in value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 
5 (very high – few restrictions). Averaged over 1995-97. 
Heritage Foundation 
Corruption  Survey indicator of the absence of corruption, with higher values 
indicating less corruption. 
ICRG 
Ethnic Fractionalization  Probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will 
not  speak the same language.  
Easterly and Levine (1997) 
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign company 
or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
GDP per Capita  GDP per capita in PPP adjusted international dollars, averaged over 
1995-1999 
World Development Indicators 
General Financing Obstacle  How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business? no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle 
(3) or a major obstacle (4) 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government 
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the 
firm, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Government Effectiveness  Principal component indicator of survey indicators measuring the 
competence of bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999) 
Growth  Growth rate of GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
Independence  Percentage of years since 1776 that a country has been independent  Easterly and Levine (1997) 
Inflation  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), line 64 
Latitude  Absolute value of the latitude of a country’s capital, normalized 
between zero and one 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2003) 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Number of Competitors  Regarding your firm's major product line, how many competitors do 
you face in your market? 
World Business Environment 




Priv  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)],  where F is 
credit by deposit money banks to the private sector (lines 22d ), GDP 
is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average 
CPI for the year.  
IFS 
Private Monitoring  Principal component indicator of nine dummy variables that measure 
whether (1) bank directors and officials are legally liable for the 
accuracy of information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks 
must publish consolidated accounts, (3) whether banks must be 
audited by certified international auditors, (4) whether 100% of the 
largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) 
whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public,  
(6) whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to 
the public, (7) whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal 
enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing (8) 
whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of  capital, and (9) 
whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no 
insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) 
Rule of Law  Principal component indicator of survey indicators measuring the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999) 
Sales  Logarithm of firm sales  World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the service 
industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Shareholder Rights  Summary indicator of the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis 
management and block holders 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
State Ownership  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more 
government owned 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) 
Supervisory Power  Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1.Does the 
supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in 
elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3.Can supervisors take legal 
action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the 
supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? 5.Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors 
or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision 
to distribute: a) Dividends?  b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8.Can 
the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration 
supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 
9.Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to  
intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 
bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency  
or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede 
shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove 
and replace directors? 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) 
 
 
  
 
 